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Non-technical Summary 
Research and development (R&D) activities of firms can be seen as investments in the 
creation of knowledge. This basic fact makes raising funds for investment in R&D projects 
different from capital investment. R&D investment is not only characterized by high, sunk, 
firm-specific investment cost and low collateral value, but also by significant adjustment cost. 
Further, the creation of positive externalities and uncertainty of returns affect financing 
conditions for such projects. Hence, firms’ R&D activities may be pursued at a sub-optimal 
level or not conducted at all if financing becomes too expensive or is not available at all. 
As investment in new knowledge is a crucial factor for the creation of wealth, from a society’s 
point of view potential underinvestment is regarded as justification for government 
intervention to promote R&D investment. However, in order to design efficient support 
programs it is crucial to identify potentially constrained firms. 
This study analyzes both R&D investment and capital investment based on firm-level panel 
data. Thereby, the effects of internal and external funding resources for both types of 
investment are compared. A positive reaction of changes in the firms’ funding resources is 
interpreted as an indication of the firms being financially constrained in their investment. 
Moreover, the models distinguish effects for firms of different size and different age. This 
allows us to identify attributes affecting the level of constriction for both types of investment. 
The results show that the availability of internal funds is more decisive for R&D investment 
than for capital investment. For both types of investment, we find a monotonic relationship 
between the impact of the constriction and firm size. The smaller the firms are, the more 
binding are financial constraints. Interestingly, capital investment reacts more sensitive to 
external constraints than R&D. We believe that this happens due to the fact that R&D is 
harder to finance through external resources in the first place. This is also reflected by the 
higher sensitivity of R&D to internal financial resources.  
When looking at age differences, the relationship between the level of constriction and R&D 
investment is non-monotonic. For capital investment, we cannot identify differences between 
different age classes. 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (Summary in German) 
Forschungs- und Entwicklungsaktivitäten (F&E) der Wirtschaft können als Investitionen die 
Schaffung neuen Wissens verstanden werden. Diese Perspektive verdeutlicht die 
fundamentalen Unterschiede zwischen F&E und anderen Formen von unternehmerischen 
Investitionen. F&E-Aktivitäten sind insbesondere gekennzeichnet durch hohe, versunkene, 
und oftmals firmenspezifische Kosten. Darüber hinaus enstehen meist nur geringe 
Anlagewerte, die als Sicherheiten bei der Finanzierung herangezogen werden können. 
Die Entstehung positiver Externalitäten sowie Unsicherheit über den Erfolg der Investition 
können Finanzierungsbedingungen entscheidend beeinträchtigen. Zusätzlich sind F&E-
Aufwendungen durch hohe Anpassungskosten charakterisiert. Dies kann dazu führen, dass 
privatwirtschaftliche Investitionen in F&E nur in reduziertem Umfang unternommen oder 
sogar unterlassen werden. 
In wissensbasierten Volkswirtschaften stellen Investitionen in F&E jedoch einen der 
wichtigsten Faktoren für technologischen Fortschritt und wirtschaftliches Wachstum dar. 
Folglich werden potenziell unterlassene Investitionen häufig zur Rechtfertigung staatlicher 
Intervention zur Förderung von F&E-Aktivitäten in der Wirtschaft herangezogen. Für die 
effiziente Gestaltung solcher Programme ist es jedoch von großer Bedeutung solche Firmen 
zu identifizieren, die tatsächlich aufgrund von Finanzierungsengpässen geplante F&E-
Projekte reduzieren oder sogar gänzlich unterlassen müssen.  
Die nachfolgende Studie leistet einen Beitrag zu der Identifizierung von Unternehmen, die 
aufgrund mangelnder Finanzierungsmöglickeiten in der Durchführung von Investitionen in 
F&E eingeschränkt sind. Die Analyse basiert auf empirischen Modellen für F&E-
Investitionen einerseits und Anlageinvestitionen andererseits. Dazu werden Panel-Daten 
deutscher Unternehmen verwendet. Der Einfluss interner und externer Finanzierungsquellen 
auf die Investitionsentscheidung steht dabei im Zentrum der Untersuchung. 
Eine positive Reaktion der Investionen auf Veränderungen der Finanzierungsindikatoren kann 
als Hinweis auf eine hohe Sensibilität der Unternehmen auf die Verfügbarkeit von 
Finanzierungsmitteln interpretiert werden. Dies bedeutet, dass die Investitionsbereitschaft und 
–höhe nicht von vorhandenen Investitionsmöglichkeiten, sondern von der Verfügbarkeit von 
Finanzierungsquellen abhängt. Um firmenspezifische Attribute, die Existenz und Ausmaß der 
Finanzierungsengpässe beeinflussen, für die verschiedenen Investitionstypen identifizieren zu 
können, wird in den Modellen nach Unternehmensgröße und –alter differenziert. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass interne Finanzierungsengpässe für Investitionen in F&E eine 
bedeutendere Rolle spielen als für Anlageinvestitionen. Darüber hinaus zeigt sich, dass F&E-
Aufwendungen kleinerer Firmen mehr von externen Finanzierungsengpässen betroffen sind 
als es bei größeren Firmen der Fall ist. Dabei nimmt das Ausmaß der Finanzierungsengpässe 
monoton mit zunehmender Firmengröße ab. 
Bei einer differenzierten Betrachtung nach Unternehmensalter, lässt sich keine monotone 
Beziehung zwischen Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten und Investitionshöhe finden.  
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Abstract 
This study tests for financial constraints on R&D investment and how they 
differ from capital investment. To identify constraints in the access to 
external capital, we employ a credit rating index. Our models show that 
internal constraints, measured by mark-ups, are more decisive for R&D than 
for capital investment. For external constraints, we find a monotonic 
relationship between the level of constriction and firm size for both types of 
investment. Thus, external constraints turn out to be more binding with 
decreasing firm size. On the contrary, we do not find such monotonic 
relationships for internal constraints. Differentiation by firms’ age does not 
support lower constraints for older firms. 
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1 Introduction 
Innovations typically result from investment in research and development (R&D). From that 
perspective, R&D activities of firms can be seen as private investments in the creation of 
knowledge. This basic fact makes investment in R&D projects different from other types of 
investment.  
Like any investment, however, R&D investment projects require financial resources. R&D 
investment in particular, is characterized by high, and usually firm specific investment cost, 
on the one hand, and low collateral value, on the other hand. Moreover, establishing an R&D 
program involves significant sunk costs and adjusting the level of R&D spending is costly 
because a major part of R&D spending consists of the wages of R&D employees. As these 
employees are usually high-skilled workers, hiring and training them is very costly and leads 
to low volatility in R&D spending over time (see Hall 2002 for a survey).  
Information asymmetries between investors and managers additionally create uncertainty that 
affects financing conditions and hence may impede investment in R&D. This restriction, 
however, is not necessarily the same for all firms. Its extent may substantially depend on firm 
characteristics.  
While a large part of private R&D investments is spent by large and established companies, 
the role of either young or small- and medium sized companies increasingly attracts scholars’ 
and policy makers’ attention. The contribution of these firms to technological progress 
through R&D and innovation has been found to be crucial (Acs and Audretsch 1990, 
Audretsch 2006). 
However, given the characteristics of R&D investment, financing of such investment by 
external sources is expensive. Consequently, firms rely on internal sources of financing for 
their R&D projects to a great extent. This fact may constrain financing of R&D projects 
especially for firms whose internal financial sources are limited. Generally a firm is 
considered to be financially unconstrained if it can carry out all its R&D projects at optimal 
scale and constrained if it cannot due to insufficient financing.  
Since the study of Fazzari et al. (1988), econometric studies have tried to detect financial 
constraints by comparing different groups of firms. On the one hand, supposedly 
unconstrained firms were identified and were expected to be able to raise funds for any 
investment. For those firms, R&D spending should not be sensitive to the availability of 
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internal funds, which is usually measured by different kinds of cash flow indicators. On the 
other hand, the group of potentially constrained firms was expected to show a positive 
relationship between investment and the availability of financial resources, and thus be 
sensitive to the availability of internal funds. Classifications for grouping firms with respect to 
their investment sensitivity that are frequently used in the literature are firm size, financial 
market regimes and governance structures. However, there has been strong criticism in the 
literature whether the relationship between cash flow and investment is a sufficient indication 
of overall financial constraints (see Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000, and the response by 
Fazzari et al., 2000). Moreover, the results concerning the existence of financial constraints 
are often ambiguous in these studies (see e.g. Harhoff 1998 and Bond et al. 2006, for 
discussions).  
Because this discussion casts doubt on the cash flow approach, this study follows a different 
strategy of identifying financial constraints. We employ a credit-rating index to reflect 
financing opportunities of the rated firms more directly. As standardized credit ratings 
incorporate much more information about the firm than pure cash-flow measures, a sensitivity 
of investment to the rating index should represent a more reliable indicator of financing 
constraints. In addition, we derive an internal liquidity measure from the firms’ empirical 
price-cost-margin.  
Moreover, most previous studies focus on R&D performers, and thus neglect that a large 
share of smaller firms do not conduct R&D activities in the observed periods, possibly 
because of the lack of financial resources. Bond et al. (2006) attribute the weak results of 
many studies to the fact that ‘financial constraints may manifest themselves more in the 
decision to set up R&D facilities, rather than in decisions about the year-to-year levels of 
spending in existing research programs.’ Consequently, non-R&D performing firms and the 
endogeneity of their decision to invest in R&D are explicitly taken into account in this study. 
We set up two empirical models. While we are mainly interested in financial constraints on 
R&D, we also compare the results to a capital investment model. We interpret a positive 
sensitivity of investment to internal resources as an indication of a restriction due to a lack of 
liquidity in the firm. Furthermore, a reaction of investment to changes in the firms’ credit 
rating index serves as an indication for credit market restrictions. Moreover, our models allow 
distinguishing between differences in investment due to heterogeneity in firm size and age.  
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Our results show that indeed R&D investment differs from capital investment with respect to 
financing constraints and the importance of internal and external sources. First, the 
availability of internal funds is more decisive for R&D investments than for capital 
investment. Second, smaller firms suffer more from external constraints on R&D investment 
than larger firms.  
For capital investment, we do not find this effect. This may be due to the lower impact of 
internal liquidity for capital investment so that external financing is the preferred, because less 
expensive, financing mode for all size classes. Further, we identify inter-group financing of 
R&D as being an alternative important source of funds, as the effects are considerably 
stronger for R&D than for capital investment.  
When looking at age differences, however, no monotonic relationship between level of 
constriction and R&D-investment can be identified.  
Section 2 gives an overview of insights in the literature on financial constraints on R&D 
investment. Section 3 presents the conceptual framework of this study and describes the data 
used for our analysis. In section 4, the econometric models and the results are described and 
section 5 provides robustness checks for our findings. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Financing R&D 
Firms fund their R&D projects either from internal sources, from external sources or from 
both. Unlike for capital investment, however, access to external financing for R&D 
investment may be more restrictive due to several reasons aggravating imperfections in 
capital markets. Information asymmetries about the value of the investment on the one hand, 
and the intangibility of the assets that are being created, on the other hand, affect financing 
conditions for R&D investment. Debtholders such as banks prefer physical and redeployable 
assets as security for their loans, since those can, at least partly, be liquidated in case the 
project fails or when the firms go bankrupt. Most R&D investments, however, are sunk and 
cannot be redeployed (Alderson and Betker 1996). Moreover, serving debt requires a stable 
cash flow. That may impede financing conditions for R&D through external sources, since 
most R&D projects do not immediately lead to results that can be commercialized (especially 
those involving basic research). In many cases it can take years of investing before the first 
return is realized (Hall 2002). 
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Studies also illustrate that raising new equity in order to finance R&D may be costly. For 
example Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms will also have to take into account a 
"Lemons Premium" when raising new equity if it can be raised at all. Moreover, empirical 
studies find a negative relationship between a firm's debt ratio and its R&D intensity. This 
may reflect the fact that those firms pursue less R&D activities because they have no access to 
new external funds and at the same time have to serve existing debt (Chung and Wright 1998, 
Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004).  
Consequently, internal financing generally turns out to be the preferred option (or the only 
available option) for funding R&D investment. Internal funds may be less costly, but also 
limited. The potential problem for firms to finance R&D activities internally was first pointed 
out by Schumpeter (1934, 1939, 1942). He emphasized the necessity of temporary monopoly 
profit for financing of future R&D. Thereby arguing that (perfect) competition would not 
leave enough financial resources for R&D activities of firms in the long run. Thus, as pointed 
out by both Hall (1992) and Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), a positive cash flow may be 
more important for R&D than for other types of investment. 
Based on the conclusion that firms mainly rely on internal funds as a consequence of 
imperfect capital markets, the empirical literature focused on detecting financing constraints 
due to lacking internal financing opportunities. This has been done by testing whether cash 
flow affects investment. The test is based on the idea that R&D expenditures will be 
determined by available cash flow if borrowing is constrained. Otherwise investment should 
not be sensitive to cash flow. 
Empirical studies, however, do not always provide unambiguous results. Hall (1992), 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Harhoff (1998) find a positive relationship between 
R&D activity and cash flow for U.S. and German firms. Mulkey, Hall and Mairesse (2001) 
show that cash flow appears to be more important in the U.S. than in France for any type of 
investment. Bond et al. (2006) find for UK firms that cash flow determines whether a firm 
does R&D but not how much. They argue that this may indicate that R&D performing firms 
are a self-selected group of firms that are not constrained. However, they do not find such a 
relationship for Germany. Baghat and Welsh (1995) find a negative relationship between debt 
and R&D activity for U.S., but not for Japanese firms. For US and UK firms they observe a 
positive relationship between stock return and R&D activity two years later. Yet, they do not 
observe any relationship between cash flow and R&D. Bougheas et al. (2003) find similar 
results for Ireland.  
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Financing conditions for both internal and external sources may strongly depend on firms’ 
characteristics. Small firms can benefit from advantages in implementing R&D projects, 
because their managers often know more about technology and exhibit entrepreneurial spirit 
and a positive attitude towards risk taking. In addition, R&D personnel in small firms may 
have more influence on decisions, and the number of owners is limited leading to more 
flexibility (Acs and Audretsch 1990, Czarnitzki and Kraft 2004).  
While these aspects may positively impact financing opportunities for those firms, there are 
arguments illustrating that financing constraints due to asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders may be particularly binding for smaller firms. Small firms may have 
disadvantages because they cannot exploit scale economies and have less overall physical 
assets that could serve as collateral compared to large capital intensive companies.  
Similarly, young firms may face different conditions than more established firms. First, young 
firms may be more financially constrained, because they cannot use earlier profit 
accumulations for financing their R&D projects. Older companies may not face that 
restriction. Moreover, older firms could benefit from their established bank contacts as banks 
use relationship lending to reduce problems of asymmetric information. Newly founded firms 
may not have built such relationships yet (Petersen and Rajan 1995, Martinelli 1997, Berger 
and Udell 2002). In addition, bank financing may be limited for R&D projects of young firms 
because of the higher default risk of young companies (Fritsch et al. 2006). This problem may 
become even more severe as the "Basle II Capital Accord" requires banks to conduct detailed 
risk assessment based on standardized rating systems. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2007) suggest 
that a rating in the third worst category (out of six) already results in three times higher 
interest rates than in the best category. Assuming that especially young firms a without track 
record and with uncertain prospects are rated rather low, bank loans would become too 
expensive for those firms. Since young companies can not rely on internal funds resulting 
from cash inflow from former product sales either, financing constraints may be more binding 
for such firms (Gompers and Lerner 1999, Ritter 1991).  
Recent literature indeed provides evidence for the fact that young or small firms face financial 
constraints (Petersen and Rajan 1995, Berger and Udell 2002, Carpenter and Petersen 2002, 
Czarnitzki 2006). For older or larger companies evidence for constraints is harder to find. 
Moreover, established firms can innovate by building on their previous inventions, e.g. 
product variation or improvement, while younger firms may need to conduct more 
fundamental R&D which requires more resources and is much more uncertain.  
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In summary, the literature suggests that R&D investment may be subject to binding financial 
constraints. This may especially apply to small or young firms that may face higher cost of 
capital than larger or older firms. An empirical analysis to test for financial constraints in firm 
investment is presented in the following sections.  
3 Conceptual Framework and data 
This study advances previous work by taking into account and combining several aspects. We 
employ a credit-rating index to reflect financing opportunities of the rated firms more directly. 
This is should help to overcome the inaccuracies, arising from the measuring approaches in 
many earlier studies using cash flow as indicator for financial constraints.  
Kaplan and Zingales (2000) argue that cash-flow sensitivity is not an appropriate measure for 
financial constraints as high cash flow sensitivities to R&D investment of firms cannot be 
interpreted as evidence for those firms being more financially constraint than firms with 
smaller sensitivities. They illustrate that with the example of Microsoft, which has a high 
sensitivity to investment and a very high overall liquidity at the same time, making severe 
constraints very unlikely. Thus, they criticize that the cash flow- investment sensitivity 
approach cannot distinguish between a) firms with more cash holding because they are highly 
profitable, b) firms with high cash flow because they follow for example a non-dividend 
strategy, c) firms with a low cash flow in order to reduce managerial cash disposal or d) firms 
with a low cash flow because they are simply less profitable. Thus, a high sensitivity cannot 
be interpreted as financial constraint because it could also be the case that firms use their high 
liquidity to invest. Thus, sensitivity could even be stronger for especially solvent firms und 
lower for firms with low cash flow levels. Further, firms with free cash flow under a certain 
threshold may even exhibit the lowest sensitivities as they do not start to invest even if cash 
flow increases.  
Fazzari et al. (2000) defend their approach and point out limitations of the argumentation of 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), but the usefulness of the cash flow approach remains highly 
controversial. When criticizing cash-flow measures, Kaplan and Zingales adopt the 
methodology of a case by case manual (credit) rating of firms that provids a more 
sophisticated indicator for long term liquidity.  
The advantage of the credit rating indicator used in this article is that it is a standardized 
measure provided by Creditreform, Germany’s largest credit rating agency. Thus, it is in fact 
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the actual rating that potential lenders would use to assess the creditworthiness of the firms in 
our sample.  
In addition to the rating scores, we derive an internal liquidity measure from the firms’ 
empirical price-cost margin. While we do not use this to identify credit market constraints as 
done in earlier studies, we still want to control for the availability of internal resources. The 
fact that the sample also includes non-R&D-performers allows taking the endogeneity of their 
decision to invest in R&D explicitly into account.  
Further, we can compare R&D to capital investment for the same sample of firms. Previous 
studies such as Audretsch and Elston (2002) analyze the impact of liquidity constraints in 
capital investment on a sample of German firms. Their study is motivated by the idea that the 
special nature of the banking dominated financial system in Germany may alleviate or even 
avoid financial constraints. Their results show that this may not be the case for all firms. 
Firms in the smallest group in their sample seem to benefit from the institutional structure. 
For medium sized firms, however, the most severe liquidity constraints can be found, while 
for the largest firms in the sample no evidence of binding financial constraints on capital 
investment can be found. Thus, their results suggest a non-monotonic relationship between 
firm size and liquidity constraints for capital investment. However, it should be noted that 
Audretsch and Elston analyze a sample of rather large, stock market listed firms and therefore 
cannot generalize their findings to non-listed firms. 
As the gap in financing due to imperfect capital markets may be especially severe when it 
comes to financing of R&D, we are interested in analyzing both financial constraints on 
capital investment and on R&D investment. Further, we aim to avoid a bias towards large 
firms by using a sample of firms that is more representative of the economy.  
Finally, our models allow distinguishing between differences in investment due to 
heterogeneity in firm size and age. 
The data used for the analysis stems from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) that 
provides us with firm-level survey data on the German business sector. The survey is 
conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim. The 
survey identifies process and product innovators as well as non-innovative firms in 
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manufacturing and service industries. Our study uses the survey from the manufacturing 
sector and our sample covers the years 1992 to 2002.1  
Our sample is more representative of the economy than those used in several earlier studies, 
where scholars had to restrict their analysis to large firms or R&D-performing due to 
limitations in data availability.  
Due to a large fraction of small firms (median size = 140 employees; a quarter of firms is 
smaller than 44 employees), firms may not conduct R&D in every year. We take this 
censoring of the dependent variable into account by estimating censored regression models 
(Tobit).  
Taking the skewness of the distribution into account, we employ logarithms, ln(1+R&D), as 
dependent variable in our R&D investment model.2 As we are also interested in the 
differences in patterns for constraints between capital investment and R&D investment, we 
also run our models for capital investment (INV). As the distribution of capital investment is 
also skewed, we use the logarithm, that is ln(1+INV), here as well. 
Since we want to identify financial constraints on R&D investment and capital investment in 
our models, the most important right-hand side variables are our indicators for the availability 
of funds. On the one hand, we include the credit rating index measuring access to external 
capital. We observe the level of constriction directly through the credit rating, which is a 
continuous measure (RATING). The credit rating is an index between 1 and 6, whereby an 
index of 6 represents the best rating
3
.  
We also construct additional variables that allow to model heterogeneous effects of the rating 
index for firms of different size classes. For this purpose, we interact RATING with 4 dummy 
variables (0 = does not belong to this size class, 1 = belongs to this size class) that attribute 
each firm to one of 4 size classes. Thereby, each of the four size classes contains 25% of the 
firms in the sample. This leads to 4 interaction-terms: 
                                                
1
 The questionnaire changes every year, and unfortunately the years 1999 and 2000 cannot be used in this study 
as relevant variables were not part of the survey in these years. 
2 
R&D expenditure and capital investment are measured in million “Deutsche Mark” (1 DM ≈ 0.51 EUR). 
3
It should be noted that we use an inverted version of the original rating index for easier interpretation of the 
estimated effects. The original index ranges from 100 to 600, where 600 represents the worst rating. We simply 
switch it around so that higher values of the regressor stand for an improved rating. Further, we divided the 
rating by 100 in the regression models.  
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, 1 _ _          with  1,...,4i tRATING SIZE CLASS X X− × = . 
Because, we are not only interested in differences between firms of different size, but also in 
differences between firms of different age, we construct such interaction terms for equally 
sized AGE-classes analogous: 
, 1 _ _          with  =  1,..., 4i tRATING AGE CLASS X X− × . 
Kaplan and Zingales (2000) argue that the practice of splitting the sample according to a 
measure of financial constraints and then comparing the sensitivities across groups only 
justified if investment sensitivities increase monotonically in the degree of financial 
constraints. Adding the 4 interaction terms to our models, allows us to test whether we indeed 
find such a monotonic relationship.  
In order to test for monotonicity for our internal liquidity measure PCM, we also construct  
, 1 _ _              with  =  1,..., 4i tPCM SIZE CLASS X X− × . 
Although we do not identify constraints through investment-cash flow relationships solely, we 
still want to control for the availability of internal funds. For the measurement of internal 
resources, scholars typically use cash-flow. As our data is based on a survey and is not limited 
to large firms which are obliged to publish balance sheet information, we do not observe cash-
flow for our sample. Instead, we calculate an approximation for the availability of internal 
funds, the empirical price-cost margin (PCM) as  
(Sales  - Staff Cost  -  Material Cost   R&D )
  
Sales
it it it it
it
it
PCM
δ+ ⋅
= . 
This approach has been widely used in the literature (see Collins and Preston 1969, 
Ravenscraft 1983 for the seminal papers). Since R&D is an expense, the decision to invest in 
R&D will decrease PCM in the corresponding period. As we want to measure internally 
available funds during the year irrespective of the actual investment decision, it is common to 
add the R&D expenses back into PCM (cf. Harhoff 1998). As PCM does not account for 
capital cost, we only add the staff and material cost shares of R&D. These amount to 93% (δ 
= 0.93) according to the Wissenschaftsstatistik (1999) which is the official German R&D 
statistic. 
Further control variables are firm size measured by the value of fixed assets ln(SIZE) and its 
squared value ln(SIZE)2. We include this capital-related size measure, instead of using the 
total number of employees, for example, as capital may serve as collateral in credit 
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negotiations with potential lenders, facilitating access to external sources of financing. We 
also use firms’ age ln(AGE) to control for age-related effects. For instance, younger firms 
may conduct more R&D ceteris paribus than older firms as those could have more established 
products in the market. As we consider intra-group flows of resources as important option for 
funding investment projects, we include a dummy variable (GROUP) that is equal to one, if a 
firm is part of a group, and takes the value of zero otherwise.     
We take business cycle effects into account by including a set of 8 time dummies (t) and we 
control for variation of R&D intensity across sectors by adding 10 industry dummies (IND) to 
our models. In order to avoid direct simultaneity between investment and the explanatory 
variables, we use lagged values of all time variant variables (except AGE).  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Average R&D expenditure (R&D) over all 
firms and years in the full sample is about 8 million DM (4.1 million €). In the sample of 
innovators only, that we use for our robustness checks, average R&D expenditure is naturally, 
although only slightly, higher. The same pattern applies to average capital investment (INV) 
that is with about 11 million DM and about 12 million DM higher for both samples, 
respectively. Average firm size (SIZE) measured in fixed assets is also considerably higher in 
the sample that excludes non-innovating firms. Average age is about 49 years in the full 
samples and about 50 years in the restricted sample. Interestingly, the average credit rating is 
only slightly higher among the innovators compared to the full sample.  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Unit 
Full Sample 
(5,070 obs.) 
Innovators only 
(4,037 obs.) 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
R&Dit 
R&D expenditure in  
million DM 
8.056 74.088 0 2,030.612 8.606 76.898 0 2,030.612
INVit 
investment in  million 
DM 
11.070 100.203 0 3965 12.302 110.390 0 3965
INNOEXPit 
innovation expend. in  
million DM* 
11.906 115.211 0 3719 13.672 126.914 0 3,719
SIZEi,t-1 
Fixed assets in 
thousand DM 
46.450 235.415 0 5,255.084 49.262 234.556 0 5,255.084
AGEit 
Years elapsed since 
founding 
48.561 41.050 1 198 49.878 41.742 1 198
PCMi,t-1 
Empirical price cost 
margin 
0.272 0.152 -0.470 0.825 0.274 0.149 -0.470 0.825
RATINGit-1/100 
Credit rating index; 1 
= worst rating  
5.010 0.550 1 6 5.047 0.538 1 6
GROUP 
dummy for firms that 
are part of a group  
0.359 0.480 0 1 0.416 0.493 0 1
Note: time and industry dummies omitted. *Used as an alternative limited dependent variable in the robustness 
checks. The number of observation for this variable is limited to 4,572 (full sample) and 3,615 (innovators only). 
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4 Econometric Models and Results 
We estimate two different econometric models. First, we follow a pooled cross-sectional 
approach and second, we employ a random effects estimator to our panel data. The 
investment models to be estimated can be written as 
( )
( )
'
2
max 0, , 1,2, , , 1, 2, ,
| , 0,
it it i it
it i i u
I x c u i N t T
u x c N
β
σ
= + + = =… …
∼
 
where Iit is the dependent variable (both denoted as I being the natural logarithm of INV and 
R&D, respectively), xit denotes the set of regressors, β the parameters to be estimated, and ci 
the unobserved firm-specific effect, and uit is the error term. We estimate two versions of this 
model. First, we assume that ci = 0. Hence, the model can be estimated as a simple pooled 
cross-sectional model, where we adjust the standard errors for firm clusters to account for the 
panel structure of the data. Thus, we allow the error terms to be correlated within firm 
observations. The pooled model has the advantage that it is not necessary to maintain the 
strict exogeneity assumption. While uit certainly has to be independent of xit, the relationship 
between uit and xis, t ≠ s, is not specified (see Wooldridge, 2002: 538). Hence, the model 
allows for feedback of R&D in period t to the regressors in future periods, for instance. In the 
second version of the model, we apply a random-effects Tobit panel estimator so that ci ≠ 0. 
However, this requires the strict exogeneity assumption. In addition, the random-effects Tobit 
requires the assumption that ci is uncorrelated with xit.  
The basic model is specified as:   
( )20 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 51
17 26
6
7 18
ln ln ln*it it it it itit
it k ik s s i it
k s
I RATING PCM SIZE SIZE (AGE)
       + GROUP + IND t c u
β β β β β β
β β β
− − −
−
= =
= + + + + +
+ + +∑ ∑
 
and  
26
*
1
0
  if     0
0     otherwise
it jit j i it
jit
I x c u
I
β
−
=

+ + >
= 


∑
 
After estimating the baseline models, we allow that the effects of the rating vary with firm 
size. There we estimate four separate slope coefficients of the rating variable for each size 
class through our interaction terms of the rating with firm size. Similarly, we proceed with the 
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age interactions subsequently. We are interested whether we find a monotonic relationship 
between the rating and the size or age class, so that the investment constraints become more 
binding for either smaller or younger firms.  
The results of both our baseline models and the extended specifications including the 
interaction terms of RATING with firm size classes are presented in Table 2. The first two 
columns present the results from the pooled cross-sectional model. For both, R&D investment 
and capital investment, SIZE and its squared term are highly significant. As both coefficients 
are positive, we find that the estimated coefficients describe a u-shaped curve, where the data, 
however, only cover the right branch of the parable. Thus the investment level is 
monotonically increasing with firm size. Being part of a group also turns out to positively 
impact both types of investment. Interestingly, this effect is considerably higher for R&D 
investment. This points to the conclusion that firms that are associated with a group have 
access to additional capital through their parent companies. This seems to be important for 
R&D, as firms may well be constrained by their own internal resources and their access to the 
credit market. AGE has also a significant, positive effect on R&D-investment, but not on 
capital investment. Note that we also experimented with non-linear age effects, but unlike the 
case of firm size, these never turned out to be significant. 
Our measures for availability of financing (PCM, RATING) are highly positively significant 
for both types of investment, naturally indicating that both a higher price-cost margin and a 
better rating support higher firm investments. Yet, the results show differences between R&D 
and capital investment. The coefficient of PCM, reflecting the importance of internal sources 
of financing, is much higher for R&D investment than it is for capital investments. 
Accordingly, the impact of the indicator of availability of external funds is smaller for R&D 
investment compared to general investment. 
The estimated coefficients describe the marginal effects of the regressors on the investment 
propensity I*, such that (see e.g. Greene, 2000: 908-910). 
* '
i i
k
ik
E I x
x
β
 ∂  
=
∂
. 
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Table 2: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D) and ln(1+INV) and RATING*SIZE_CLASS interactions (5,070 obs.) 
 Pooled Cross Section Model 
Pooled Cross Section Model  
- RATING*SIZE classes - 
Random-Effects Panel Model 
- RATING*SIZE classes -- 
Variable 
 
ln(R&D)it ln(INV) it ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it 
ln(SIZE i,t-1) 0.194 *** 0.224 *** 0.276 *** 0.289*** 0.180*** 0.252*** 
 (0.021)  (0.010)  (0.028)  (0.016) (0.020) (0.013) 
ln(SIZE i,t-1)
2 0.050 *** 0.054 *** 0.052 *** 0.051*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 
 (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
ln(AGE) it 0.072 ** 0.007  0.078 ** 0.011 0.119*** 0.065*** 
 (0.033)  (0.017)  (0.033)  (0.017) (0.027) (0.018) 
GROUPit 0.317 *** 0.178 *** 0.340 *** 0.191*** 0.158*** 0.134*** 
 (0.057)  (0.035)  (0.057)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) 
PCM i,t-1 1.011 *** 0.336 *** 1.013 *** 0.340*** 0.351*** 0.147** 
 (0.158)  (0.092)  (0.156)  (0.092) (0.094) (0.067) 
RATING i,t-1/100 0.147 *** 0.181 ***      
 (0.057)  (0.031)       
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_1     0.197 *** 0.219*** 0.122*** 0.183*** 
     (0.062)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.024) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_2     0.172 *** 0.176*** 0.115*** 0.136*** 
     (0.061)  (0.033) (0.033) (0.023) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_3     0.125 ** 0.152*** 0.085** 0.111*** 
     (0.060)  (0.032) (0.033) (0.023) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_4     0.088  0.150*** 0.074** 0.085*** 
     (0.062)  (0.034) (0.033) (0.024) 
Test of joint significance of time dummies χ
2
(8) = 89.96*** χ
2
(8) = 16.26* χ
2
(8) = 89.07*** χ
2
(8) = 24.71*** χ
2
(8) = 89.69*** χ
2
(8) = 25.14*** 
Test of joint significance of industry 
dummies 
χ
2
(10) = 308.68*** χ
2
(10) = 23.71*** χ
2
(10) = 305.70*** χ
2
(10) = 16.45* χ
2
(10) = 360.80*** χ
2
(10) = 27.76** 
Test of difference of RATING*SIZE 
interactions 
  χ
2
(3) = 12.35*** χ
2
(3) = 24.97*** χ
2
(3) = 11.94*** χ
2
(3) = 58.36*** 
Log-Likelihood -5,090.83 -5,451.16 -5,074.12 -5,428.84 -4,071.32 -4,839.11 
ρ - - - - 0.724 0.518 
# censored observations  2,414 309 2,414  309  2,414 309  
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models).  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation.
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Since our dependent variable is specified in logarithms, a unit change in our main variables of 
interest, i.e. PCM and RATING, can be interpreted as a percentage change in investment. For 
instance, if the price-cost margin changes from 10% to 20%, R&D investment (in terms of the 
latent index I*) changes by 10%, all else constant, and capital investment only changes by 
about 3%. If the rating changes by 1 unit in our regression, R&D would change by 15% and 
capital investment by 18%.  
Note that we could also compute the marginal effect on I instead of I* as 
'
'
i i i
k
ik
E I x x
x
ββ
σ
 ∂   
= ⋅Φ  ∂  
. 
In this case, R&D would change by 5% in response to a 10% change in PCM and by 7% if the 
rating changes by 1 unit, on average. Capital investment would increase by 2.6% in response 
to a 10% increase of PCM, and by 14% for a unit change in the rating. 
The more interesting conclusion with respect to firm size, however, can be drawn from the 
regressions with interaction terms. First, we find that the estimated coefficients are not only 
significantly different from zero, but that they also differ from each other (see chi-squared 
tests at bottom of Table 2). In terms of marginal impact on I*, a unit change in the rating 
causes the smallest firms to adjust R&D by about 20%. However, the effect monotonically 
decreases with increasing firm size from 20%, to 17%, 13% and 9% (last coefficient not 
significant), respectively in pooled cross-sectional model. In the panel model, the marginal 
effects are somewhat smaller but still monotonically decreasing and significantly different 
from zero as well as significantly different from each other. Again, the marginal effects on the 
capital investment propensity are larger than those for R&D. 
As we observe from our first models that firms have to rely more on internal financing for 
R&D than for capital investment, we are also interested in testing for monotonicity in the 
relationship between investment and the interaction of firm size and PCM. This resembles, to 
a certain extent, the earlier studies on investment-cash flow relationships, where scholars tried 
to identify financial constraints purely by investment-cash flow sensitivities. There, financial 
constraints were interpreted as being present if a group of firms did not show any sensitivity 
(insignificant coefficient) but another group (e.g. smaller firms) did. We, however, 
supplement this approach by our credit rating, and thus, one should not expect to find a 
monotonic relationship (see also the Kaplan-Zingales critique mentioned earlier).  
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Table 3 presents the results from the extended models. The estimates on the firm level 
controls remain similar to the previous specification. While the effects for the RATING*SIZE 
interactions also remain robust (compare to Table 2), the coefficients of the PCM*SIZE 
interaction terms are not monotonically decreasing. Furthermore, the test on differences 
between the PCM coefficients reveals that they are not significantly different from each other. 
Thus, all models collapse to the ones shown in Table 2.  
Age effects 
While we already controlled for firm age in the previous models, we are still interested if 
firms’ age and size have comparable effects on the access to external funding. For this, we 
include , 1 _ _i tRATING AGE CLASS X− ⋅  interactions rather than interactions with size classes. 
Interestingly, age seems to have a less clear effect on credit availability. We do neither find a 
monotonic relationship for R&D nor for capital investment. Therefore, we believe that access 
to external funding is more related to size arguments, especially such as collateral for 
additional loans, rather than to age argumentations, such as missing track histories or lending 
relationships with banks or suppliers. The detailed regression results are relegated to the 
appendix (see Table A.1). 
 
  16 
 
Table 3: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D) and ln(1+INV) and RATING*SIZE_CLASS  
and PCM*SIZE_CLASS interactions (5,070 obs.) 
 
Pooled Cross Section Model  
- RATING*SIZE classes - 
Random-Effects Panel Model 
- RATING*SIZE classes - 
Variable 
 
ln(R&D)it ln(INV) it ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it 
ln(SIZE i,t-1) 0.276 *** 0.289*** 0.182 *** 0.253*** 
 (0.028)  (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) 
ln(SIZE i,t-1)
2 0.052 *** 0.051*** 0.033 *** 0.043*** 
 (0.006)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
ln(AGE) it 0.079 ** 0.012 0.119 *** 0.066*** 
 (0.033)  (0.017) (0.027) (0.018) 
GROUPit 0.342 *** 0.192*** 0.159 *** 0.134*** 
 (0.057)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) 
      
PCM i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_1 0.861 *** 0.226** 0.086 0.115 
 (0.262)  (0.104) (0.204) (0.027) 
PCM i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_2 1.193 *** 0.375** 0.514 *** 0.266** 
 (0.247)  (0.165) (0.178) (0.120) 
PCM i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_3 1.199 *** 0.451** 0.476 *** 0.193 
 (0.305)  (0.191) (0.173) (0.132) 
PCM i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_4 0.822 *** 0.322*** 0.301 ** 0.021 
 (0.300)  (0.216) (0.148) (0.121) 
      
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_1 0.206 *** 0.225*** 0.139 *** 0.185*** 
 (0.064)  (0.034) (0.035) (0.024) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_2 0.162 *** 0.174*** 0.107 *** 0.129*** 
 (0.062)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.024) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_3 0.115 ** 0.146*** 0.078 ** 0.108*** 
 (0.060)  (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_4 0.098  0.150*** 0.077 ** 0.091*** 
 (0.063)  (0.036) (0.034) (0.025) 
      
Test of joint significance of time 
dummies 
χ
2
(8) = 89.40*** χ
2
(8) = 24.86*** χ
2
(8) = 90.45*** χ
2
(8) = 25.27*** 
Test of joint significance of 
industry dummies 
χ
2
(10) = 306.42*** χ
2
(10) = 16.43* χ
2
(10) = 370.60*** χ
2
(10) = 27.82** 
Test of difference of PCM*SIZE 
interactions 
χ
2
(3) = 1.84 χ
2
(3) = 1.37 χ
2
(3) = 3.37 χ
2
(3) = 2.41 
Test of difference of 
RATING*SIZE interactions 
χ
2
(3) = 9.67** χ
2
(3) = 23.16*** χ
2
(3) = 9.77** χ
2
(3) = 38.29*** 
Log-Likelihood -5,072.78 -5,428.11 -4,069.09 -4,837.81 
ρ   0.724 0.516 
# censored observations  2,414  309  2,414 309  
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-
sectional models).  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due 
to the cross-sectional variation. 
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5 Robustness checks 
As a robustness test of our results, we provide two different checks. First, we estimate the 
same model specifications as described in section 4 for a sub-sample of firms that have been 
innovators in at least two-periods in our overall sample period. This serves as a method to test 
whether differences between our capital investment model and the R&D investment model 
are due to the fact that we have firms in the sample that never performed any innovation 
activity. As can be seen in Table 4, all previous results obtained with the full sample are 
confirmed. This also applies to the rating-size interactions. Again, we relegate the regressions 
for the age effects to the appendix (see Table A.2), as the results do not improve for the 
subsample of innovating firms.  
As a second robustness check, we test how sensitive our results are to changes in the 
definition of investments for innovation. Since R&D is only one component of successfully 
introducing new processes or new products to the market, it is interesting to check whether 
the results persist when one considers a broader measure of innovation activity. The database 
offers the opportunity to look at total innovation expenditure rather than R&D only. In 
addition to pure internal R&D, innovation expenditure comprises outsourcing of R&D, the 
acquisition of new (lab) equipment that is linked to an innovation project, the purchase of 
other intellectual property (e.g. patents or licenses), education expenditure which become 
necessary for training employees when implementing new technologies, market introduction 
cost that arise due to a product innovation, as well as design and prototyping and related 
activities.  
The results are presented in Table 5. Note that our sample is slightly smaller than for the R&D 
regressions due to some missing values in the total innovation expenditure. So, we also 
reproduce the capital investment regressions for this sample in order to have an accurate 
comparison. These results add some interesting insights as a supplement to the R&D 
regressions. While the basic results are similar to the findings with R&D, the marginal impact 
of the RATING*SIZE interactions changes somewhat. We still find a monotonic relationship, 
but the magnitudes of the external constraints gets closer to those estimated for capital 
investment. As argued in the literature, adjusting R&D is more costly than capital investment, 
which implies that the firms try to smooth R&D spending over time. Thus, the observed 
reaction of R&D to financial constraints, as reported in Table 2, is lower than for capital 
investment. However, when looking at total innovation expenditure (Table 5), the effects 
become more similar to capital investments. This is possibly due to the fact that total 
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innovation expenditure comprise some types of investment that show lower outcome 
uncertainty or that have more collateral value (e.g. buying a patent or license). For 
completeness, we also report the results from the age interaction variables in the appendix 
(see Table 3). However, the results remain inconclusive and are thus not discussed in more 
detail. 
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Table 4: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D) and ln(1+INV) and RATING*SIZE_CLASS interactions for innovators only (4,037 obs.) 
 Pooled Cross Section Model 
Pooled Cross Section Model  
- RATING*SIZE classes - 
Random-Effects Panel Model 
- RATING*SIZE classes -- 
Variable ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it 
ln(SIZE i,t-1) 0.155 *** 0.216 *** 0.232 *** 0.281*** 0.160*** 0.250*** 
 (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.029)  (0.019) (0.021) (0.015) 
ln(SIZE i,t-1)
2 0.051 *** 0.055 *** 0.053 *** 0.052*** 0.034*** 0.042*** 
 (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
ln(AGE it) 0.068 ** 0.010  0.072 ** 0.014 0.108*** 0.076*** 
 (0.034)  (0.019)  (0.034)  (0.020) (0.030) (0.020) 
GROUPit 0.299 *** 0.191 *** 0.316 *** 0.201*** 0.169*** 0.166*** 
 (0.060)  (0.039)  (0.060)  (0.039) (0.040) (0.030) 
PCM i,t-1 0.920 *** 0.309 *** 0.914 *** 0.297*** 0.304*** 0.099 
 (0.174)  (0.110)  (0.172)  (0.109) (0.102) (0.078) 
RATING i,t-1/100 0.134 ** 0.206 ***      
 (0.059)  (0.036)       
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_1     0.182 *** 0.250*** 0.103** 0.205*** 
     (0.063)  (0.039) (0.037) (0.028) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_2     0.147 ** 0.206*** 0.089** 0.148*** 
     (0.062)  (0.039) (0.036) (0.027) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_3     0.116 * 0.186*** 0.068* 0.122*** 
     (0.061)  (0.038) (0.035) (0.027) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_4     0.081  0.182*** 0.057 0.100*** 
     (0.064)  (0.041) (0.036) (0.028) 
Test of joint significance of time 
dummies 
χ
2
(8) = 93.76*** χ
2
(8) = 21.20*** χ
2
(8) = 90.82*** χ
2
(8) = 21.44*** χ
2
(8) = 92.63*** χ
2
(8) = 21.01*** 
Test of joint significance of industry 
dummies 
χ
2
(10) = 251.79*** χ
2
(10) = 14.78 χ
2
(10) = 248.32*** χ
2
(10) = 14.22 χ
2
(10) = 259.25*** χ
2
(10) = 21.03** 
Test of difference of RATING*SIZE 
interactions 
  χ
2
(3) = 8.69** χ
2
(3) = 19.30*** χ
2
(3) = 6.94* χ
2
(3) = 60.74*** 
Log-Likelihood -4,413.42 -4,419.18 -4,402.42 -4,402.47 -3,554.75 -3,904.78 
ρ     0.704 0.532 
# censored observations 1,609 180 1,609 180 1,609 180 
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models).  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation. 
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Table 5: Tobit regressions on ln(1+INNOEXP) and ln(1+INV) and RATING*SIZE_CLASS interactions (4,602 obs.) 
 Pooled Cross Section Model 
Pooled Cross Section Model  
- RATING*SIZE classes - 
Random-Effects Panel Model 
- RATING*SIZE classes -- 
Variable ln(INNOEXP) it ln(INV) it ln(INNOEXP) it ln(INV) it ln(INNOEXP) it ln(INV) it 
ln(SIZE i,t-1) 0.221 *** 0.217 *** 0.289 *** 0.291*** 0.200*** 0.249*** 
 (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.026)  (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) 
ln(SIZE i,t-1)
2 0.051 *** 0.055 *** 0.053 *** 0.053*** 0.032*** 0.044*** 
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
ln(AGE it) 0.041  0.016  0.048  0.022 0.103*** 0.072*** 
 (0.032)  (0.017)  (0.031)  (0.017) (0.029) (0.017) 
GROUPit 0.342 *** 0.203 *** 0.366 *** 0.221*** 0.212*** 0.194*** 
 (0.057)  (0.035)  (0.057)  (0.035) (0.039) (0.028) 
PCM i,t-1 0.970 *** 0.371 *** 0.970 *** 0.370*** 0.186* 0.150** 
 (0.159)  (0.092)  (0.158)  (0.092) (0.100) (0.071) 
RATING i,t-1/100 0.156 ** 0.169 ***      
 (0.051)  (0.030)       
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_1     0.199 *** 0.214*** 0.143*** 0.182*** 
     (0.055)  (0.033) (0.035) (0.024) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_2     0.179 *** 0.168*** 0.130*** 0.135*** 
     (0.055)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.024) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_3     0.138 ** 0.138*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 
     (0.053)  (0.033) (0.034) (0.023) 
RATING i,t-1*SIZE_CLASS_4     0.108 * 0.129*** 0.100*** 0.091*** 
     (0.055)  (0.034) (0.035) (0.024) 
Test of joint significance of time 
dummies 
χ
2
(8) = 43.45*** χ
2
(8) = 21.94*** χ
2
(8) = 43.37*** χ
2
(8) = 23.09*** χ
2
(8) = 41.83*** χ
2
(8) = 23.42*** 
Test of joint significance of industry 
dummies 
χ
2
(10) = 248.68*** χ
2
(10) = 15.92 χ
2
(10) = 247.44*** χ
2
(10) = 16.15* χ
2
(10) = 223.65*** χ
2
(10) = 24.28** 
Test of difference of RATING*SIZE 
interactions 
  χ
2
(3) = 10.71** χ
2
(3) = 31.04*** χ
2
(3) = 6.41* χ
2
(3) = 55.61*** 
Log-Likelihood -5,434.92 -4,786.68 -5,422.40 -4,758.28 -4,553.89 -4,323.08 
ρ     0.683 0.466 
# censored observations 1,590 270 1,590 270 1,590 270 
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional models).  
*** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to the cross-sectional variation. 
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6 Conclusions 
Financing R&D activities externally may be costly due to outcome uncertainty, asymmetric 
information and incomplete appropriability of returns. Thus, firms may prefer to exploit 
internally available funds to finance their R&D investment as much as possible. However, 
internal funds may be limited as well. Especially small or young firms may face financing 
constraints for their R&D projects as they have not yet accumulated profits or a steady cash 
inflow from a broad and established product portfolio. Financially constrained firms may 
have to conduct their R&D activities at a sub-optimal level, abandon certain projects or not be 
able to conduct R&D at all. 
From our empirical models, we draw following main conclusions. Our results show that R&D 
investment differs from capital investment with respect to financing constraints and the 
importance of internal and external resources. First, the availability of internal funds is more 
decisive for R&D investments than for capital investment. We observe that an increase in the 
availability of internal funds, measured by increases in the firms’ price-cost-margin, has a 
larger impact on R&D investment than on capital investment. Second, smaller firms suffer 
more from external constraints for R&D investment than larger firms. That is, smaller firms’ 
level of R&D investment increases as conditions for access to external funds improve, while 
larger firms’ R&D investment is not as sensitive. Thus, financial constraints are more binding 
for smaller firms. Further, we find that the level of constriction decreases monotonically with 
firm size. Thus, the larger the firms, the fewer R&D investment projects are discarded. Larger 
firms may either be able to fund most of their projects internally at full scale or may face a 
lower gap between internal and external cost of capital. The latter argument is supported by 
the fact that the largest firms may offer sufficient collateral for external financing due to their 
overall asset value. When looking at age differences, however, we cannot not draw analogous 
conclusions. We do not find monotonic relationships between financial constraints and age.  
In addition, intra-group financing of R&D, being a supplemental measure of internal liquidity, 
turns out to be another important source of funds, as the effects are considerably stronger for 
R&D than for capital investment.  
Finally, the results are robust to a number of additional tests. All results persist in both pooled 
cross-sectional regressions and panel data regressions that allow controlling for firm-specific 
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unobserved effects in the level of investment. Also robustness checks on total innovation 
expenditure rather than pure R&D show similar result patterns as discussed above.  
As investment in new knowledge is a crucial factor in the creation of wealth, potential 
underinvestment is regarded as justification for government intervention to promote R&D 
investment from a society’s point of view. This study aimed at contributing to the 
identification of firms that are potentially not able to pursue their R&D projects at the optimal 
level.  
As small firms appear to be more concerned with financing constraints than larger firms, 
countries with well developed markets for Venture Capital and IPOs are likely to achieve a 
comparative advantage in R&D for high-tech or other knowledge intensive goods and 
services (Chiao 2002, Carpenter and Petersen 2002). Otherwise there may be room for 
innovation policies supporting R&D in small businesses. 
Despite our effort to detect and interpret the effects of the limited financial resources for R&D 
investment, our study has some important limitations. We attempt to overcome the Kaplan-
Zingales critique that previous studies identified financial constraints only indirectly, which is 
implemented by supplementing common regressions with a credit rating index that directly 
measures credit access. However, the panel structure of our data is not rich enough to estimate 
investment models that are well grounded in economic theory, such as Euler equations, 
accelerator models or error-correction models that all revolve around the firms’ challenge to 
achieve an “optimal” capital stock through their investment. It would be desirable to extend 
the common investment models to direct measures for external constraints in the future.  
  23 
References 
Acs, Z. and D. Audretsch (1990), Innovation and Small Firms, MIT Press, Boston. 
Audretsch, D. (2006), Entrepreneurship, innovation, and economic growth, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Chaltham. 
Audretsch, D. and J.A. Elston (2002), Does firm size matter? Evidence on the impact of 
liquidity constraints on firm investment behavior in Germany, International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 20, pp. 1-17. 
Alderson, M. and B. Betker (1996), Liquidation costs and accounting data, Financial 
Management 25(2), pp. 25-36. 
Berger, A. and G. Udell (2002), Small business credit availability and relationship lending: 
the importance of bank organizational structure, Economic Journal 112, pp. 32-53. 
Bhagat, S. and I. Welch (1995), Corporate Research and Development Investments -
International Comparisons, Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, pp. 443-470. 
Bond, S., D. Harhofff, and J. Van Reenen (2006), Investment, R&D and financial constraints 
in Britain and Germany, Annales d’Économie et de Statistique, forthcoming. 
Bougheas, S., Görg, H. and Strobl, E. (2003), Is R&D financially constrained? Theory and 
Evidence from Irish Manufacturing, Review of Industrial Organization 22(2), pp. 159-
174. 
Carpenter, R. and Petersen, B. (2002), Capital Market Imperfections, High-Tech Investment, 
and New Equity Financing, The Economic Journal 112, pp. 54-72. 
Chiao, C. (2002), Relationship between Debt, R&D and Physical Investment, Evidence from 
U.S. Firm-Level Data, Applied Financial Economics 12, pp. 105-121. 
Chung, K. and Wright, P. (1998), Corporate Policy and Market Value: A q-Theory Approach, 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 11(3), pp. 293-310. 
Collins, N.R. and L.E. Preston (1969), Price-cost margins and industry structure, Review of 
Economics and Statistics 51(3), pp. 271-286. 
Czarnitzki, D. (2006), Research and development in small- and medium-sized enterprises: 
The role of financial constraints and public funding, Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 53(3), pp. 257-335. 
Czarnitzki, D. and Kraft, K. (2004), Management control and innovative activity, Review of 
Industrial Organization 24(1), pp. 1-24. 
Czarnitzki, D. and Kraft, K. (2007), Are credit ratings valuable information?, Applied 
Financial Economics, 17(13), pp. 1061-1070. 
Fazzari, S.M., R.G. Hubbard, and B.C. Petersen (1988), Financing Constraints and Corporate 
Investment, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1988(1), 141-206. 
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. and Petersen, B. (2000), Investment-cash flow sensitivities are 
useful: A comment on Kaplan and Zingales, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
115(2), p. 695-705. 
  24 
Fritsch, M., Brixy, U. and Falck, O. (2006), The Effect of Industry, Region and Time on New 
Business Survival - A Multi-Dimensional Analysis, Review of Industrial Organization 
28, pp. 285–306. 
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (1999), The Venture Capital Cycle, Cambridge MA: MIT Press.  
Greene, W.H. (2000), Econometric Analysis, 4
th
 edition, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.  
Hall, B. (1992), Research and development at the firm level: Does the source of financing 
matter?, NBER Working Paper No. 4096. 
Hall, B. (2002), The financing of research and development, Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 18(1), pp. 35-51. 
Harhoff, D. (1998), Are there financing constraints for R&D and investment in German 
manufacturing firms?, Annales d’Economie et de Statistique 49/50, pp. 421-456. 
Himmelberg, C. and Peterson, B. (1994), R&D and internal finance: A panel study of small 
firms in high-tech industries, Review of Economics and Statistics 76, pp. 38-51. 
Kaplan, S. and L. Zingales (1997), Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful 
measures of financing constraints?, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(1), pp. 
169-215. 
Kaplan, S. and L. Zingales (2000), Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Are Not Valid 
Measures Of Financing Constraints, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(2), pp. 
707-712  
Martinelli, C. (1997), Small firms, borrowing constraints, and reputation, Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 33, pp. 91-105. 
Mulkay, B., Hall, B. and Mairesse, J. (2001), Investment and R&D in France and in the 
United States, in D. Bundesbank (ed.), Investing Today for the World of Tomorrow, 
Springer Verlag. 
Myers, S. and N. Majluf (1984), Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms 
have information that investors do not, Journal of Financial Economics 13, pp. 187-
221. 
Petersen, M. and R. Rajan (1995), The effect of credit market competition on lending 
relationships: Evidence from small business data, Journal of Finance 49, pp. 3-37. 
Ravenscraft, D.J. (1983), Structure-profit relationships at the line of business and industry 
level, Review of Economics and Statistics 65, 22-31. 
Ritter, J. (1991), The long-run performance of initial public offerings, Journal of Finance 46, 
pp. 3-27. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934), The Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1939), Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis 
of the Capitalist Process, New York, McGraw-Hill. 
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York, Harper and Row. 
Wissenschaftsstatistik GmbH im Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wirtschaft (eds) (1999), 
Forschung und Entwicklung in der Wirtschaft 1997-1999, Essen. 
  25 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press: 
Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
 
  26 
Appendix 
Table A1: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D) and ln(1+INV) and RATING*AGE_CLASS interactions (5,070 obs.) 
 
Pooled Cross Section Model  
- RATING*AGE classes - 
Random-Effects Panel Model 
- RATING*AGE classes -- 
Variable ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it 
ln(SIZE i,t-1) 0.191 *** 0.224*** 0.143*** 0.182*** 
 (0.020)  (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) 
ln(SIZE i,t-1)
2 0.049 *** 0.053*** 0.031*** 0.042*** 
 (0.006)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
ln(AGE) it -0.0446  -0.045 0.005 0.031 
 (0.080)  (0.043) (0.051) (0.036) 
GROUPit 0.312 *** 0.177*** 0.015*** 0.121*** 
 (0.057)  (0.035) (0.035) (0.026) 
PCM i,t-1 1.014 *** 0.336*** 0.353*** 0.153** 
 (0.158)  (0.092) (0.094) (0.067) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_1 0.144 ** 0.173*** 0.076*** 0.131*** 
 (0.060)  (0.033) (0.035) (0.025) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_2 0.126 ** 0.175*** 0.059*** 0.131*** 
 (0.056)  (0.031) (0.033) (0.024) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_3 0.139 ** 0.179*** 0.076*** 0.128*** 
 (0.056)  (0.031) (0.034) (0.024) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_4 0.214 *** 0.205*** 0.154** 0.152*** 
 (0.058)  (0.034) (0.035) (0.067) 
Test of joint significance of time 
dummies 
χ
2
(8) = 88.52*** χ
2
(8) = 23.79*** χ
2
(8) = 88.35*** χ
2
(8) = 24.14*** 
Test of joint significance of industry 
dummies 
χ
2
(10) = 312.12*** χ
2
(10) = 16.17* χ
2
(10) = 376.60*** χ
2
(10) = 28.15*** 
Test of difference of RATING*AGE 
interactions 
χ
2
(3) = 20.13*** χ
2
(3) = 5.67 χ
2
(3) = 40.84*** χ
2
(3) = 6.84* 
Log-Likelihood -5,058.33 -5,443.54 -4,057.44 -4,864.77 
ρ   0.722 0.510 
# censored observations  2,414 309 2,414  309  
Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional 
models). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due  
to the cross-sectional variation. 
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Table A2: Tobit regressions on ln(1+R&D) and ln(1+INV) and RATING*AGE_CLASS interactions for innovators only (4,037 obs.)  
 
Pooled Cross Section Model  
- RATING*AGE classes - 
Random-Effects Panel Model 
- RATING*AGE classes -- 
Variable ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it ln(R&D) it ln(INV) it 
ln(SIZE i,t-1) 0.154 *** 0.216*** 0.125*** 0.171*** 
 (0.023)  (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
ln(SIZE i,t-1)
2 0.050 *** 0.054*** 0.032*** 0.042*** 
 (0.006)  (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
ln(AGE it) -0.050  -0.115 0.032 0.009 
 (0.083)  (0.050) (0.055) (0.042) 
GROUPit 0.296 *** 0.191 0.161*** 0.155*** 
 (0.060)  (0.039) (0.040) (0.030) 
PCM i,t-1 0.918 *** 0.311*** 0.313*** 0.115 
 (0.173)  (0.109) (0.101) (0.030) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_1 0.125 ** 0.181*** 0.060 0.132*** 
 (0.062)  (0.038) (0.038) (0.030) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_2 0.124 ** 0.198*** 0.050 0.136*** 
 (0.057)  (0.035) (0.036) (0.028) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_3 0.129 ** 0.212*** 0.050 0.136*** 
 (0.059)  (0.036) (0.036) (0.027) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_4 0.198 *** 0.252*** 0.121*** 0.173*** 
 (0.061)  (0.039) (0.037) (0.029) 
Test of joint significance of  time 
dummies 
χ
2
(8) = 93.44*** χ
2
(8) = 20.77*** χ
2
(8) = 92.49*** χ
2
(8) = 19.21** 
Test of joint significance of  industry 
dummies 
χ
2
(10) = 254.69*** χ
2
(10) = 15.09 χ
2
(10) = 279.02*** χ
2
(10) = 21.09** 
Test of difference of  RATING*AGE 
interactions 
χ
2
(4) = 13.18*** χ
2
(4) = 10.98** χ
2
(4) = 27.56*** χ
2
(4) = 12.36*** 
Log-Likelihood -4,392.91 -4,405.92 -3,544.08 -3,928.54 
ρ   0.732 0.589 
# censored observations 1,609 180 1,609 180 
 Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-
sectional models). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance 
which is due to the cross-sectional variation. 
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Table A3: Tobit regressions on ln(1+INNOEXP) and ln(1+INV) and RATING*AGE_CLASS interactions (4,602 obs.)  
 
Pooled Cross Section Model  
- RATING*AGE classes - 
Random-Effects Panel Model 
- RATING*AGE classes -- 
Variable ln(INNOEXP)it ln(INV) it ln(INNOEXP) it ln(INV) it 
ln(SIZE i,t-1) 0.218 *** 0.216*** 0.168*** 0.179*** 
 (0.018)  (0.010) (0.014) (0.009) 
ln(SIZE i,t-1)
2 0.049 *** 0.055*** 0.030*** 0.044*** 
 (0.005)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
ln(AGE it) -0.040  -0.030 0.015 0.054 
 (0.081)  (0.043) (0.055) (0.038) 
GROUPit 0.334 *** 0.202*** 0.200*** 0.177 
 (0.056)  (0.035) (0.039) (0.028) 
PCM i,t-1 0.962 *** 0.372*** 0.191* 0.156** 
 (0.158)  (0.092) (0.100) (0.071) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_1 0.161 *** 0.161*** 0.111*** 0.135*** 
 (0.054)  (0.032) (0.036) (0.025) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_2 0.141 *** 0.165*** 0.087** 0.131*** 
 (0.051)  (0.031) (0.035) (0.024) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_3 0.139 *** 0.168*** 0.095*** 0.128*** 
 (0.052)  (0.031) (0.034) (0.124) 
RATING i,t-1*AGE_CLASS_4 0.214 *** 0.188*** 0.172** 0.145*** 
 (0.055)  (0.033) (0.036) (0.025) 
Test of joint significance of  time 
dummies 
χ
2
(8) = 39.36*** χ
2
(8) = 21.78 χ
2
(8) = 38.62*** χ
2
(8) = 22.86*** 
Test of joint significance of  industry 
dummies 
χ
2
(10) = 252.82*** χ
2
(10) = 15.70 χ
2
(10) = 229.57*** χ
2
(10) = 23.29*** 
Test of difference of  RATING*AGE 
interactions 
χ
2
(4) = 20.95*** χ
2
(4) = 2.93 χ
2
(4) = 38.23*** χ
2
(4) = 4.14 
Log-Likelihood -5,401.68 -4,782.89 -4,538.10 -4,348.61 
ρ   0.680 0.464 
# censored observations 1,590 270 1,590 270 
 Notes: All models include an intercept (not presented). Standard errors in parentheses (clustered in pooled cross-sectional  
models). *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5, 10%). ρ indicates the share of the total variance which is due to 
the cross-sectional variation 
 
